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NEW ISSUES RAISED BY RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
In addressing the new issues raised by Respondents Brief, Petitioner/Appellant, 
Sandra Sheikh will be referred to as "Petitioner" and Respondent/Appellee, State of 
Utah/Utah Department of Public Safety will be referred to as "Respondent". 
The new issues raised by the Respondent Brief in responds to Petitioner's Brief 
are: (1) Did Petitioner address the ALJ decision that she had failed to meet a prima 
facie case; and (2) whether Petitioner met her burden to marshal favorable evidence 
supporting the ALf's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER DID ADDRESS THE ALTS 
DETERMINATION THAT SHE FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASK 
Respondent claims Petitioner did not address the prima facie issues. Respondent 
cites Love vs. ReMax of AM.. 738 F.2d 383 (10th Qr. 1984) for the proposition that to 
establish a prima facie case on employment discrimination the charging party must show 
that she (1) engaged in a protected activity, (2) was subjected by the employer to adverse 
employment action and (3) a causal link between the two. 
Petitioner did in fact address the three prongs of the test in her Brief. 
On pages 17 and 19 of Petitioner's Brief, Petitioner discussed the standard for 
finding a "discriminatory intent". Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah. Inc.. 639 E2d 1199 
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(D. Utah 1986) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973) both 
stand for the proposition that no one is likely to admit to such discriminatory intent and 
circumstantial evidence and indirect evidence must be considered. Petitioner's Brief is 
replete with examples of circumstantial and indirect evidence. The case of Nulf v. 
International Paper Company, 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1981) stands for the proposition 
that if pregnancy or pregnancy-related matters are followed by disparate treatment 
and/or termination of employment, there is an inference that there was a discriminatory 
motive, i j^ , a causal link between the pregnancy and disparate treatment. That 
discriminatory motive can be rebutted by a very dissatisfactory explanation for the 
conduct of which is complained. 
There was never any dispute between the parties that Petitioner took a leave for 
pregnancy and upon return was given a schedule which was an unusually onerous. It was 
established and unrebutted during the course of the administrative hearing that no one 
in the two years following consolidation had been given a pre-planned schedule or 
worked a schedule like the one Petitioner had been given on her return from maternity 
leave and no one after that was given such a schedule even though there were rotating 
schedules, absences, leaves, illnesses and other problems. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact 
Statement Nos. 9, 12, 22, 23, 24, 30, 42, 44, 49). Ergo, disparate treatment. 
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Petitioner, in her Brief, also cited and discussed the application of Garner v. Wal-
Mart Stores. Inc.. 807 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1987) wherein a prima facie case of 
discrimination was established. The Plaintiff returned after maternity leave to find she 
was placed as a "floater" between departments instead of in her former position as 
manager. She quit the first day back. The Court determined that the employer should 
try to ameliorate the situation and give assurance of a change but she left before the 
employer had a chance; thus, it was not "constructive discharge". Petitioner's Brief 
demonstrates that Respondent had, at a minimum, 2 weeks after learning of her 
dissatisfaction with the schedule to give assurances and ameliorate the schedule but did 
nothing. (See Petitioner's Fact Statement No. 29; see Respondent's Brief, p. 37, citing 
R. 630, 668). 
Thus, Petitioner did in fact address the issues of discriminatory intent and 
constructive discharge and disparate treatment throughout her entire Brief. It appears 
that Respondent's primary complaint is one of form over substance, that is, that 
Petitioner did not choose to segregate that issue from the remainder of the Brief by 
assigning it as a separate point heading. The issue was so integral to the entire case that 
it was discussed throughout Petitioner's entire Brief. 
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POINT II 
PETITIONER DID MEET THE BURDEN OF 
MARSHALLING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE ALJ FINDINGS AND OF PRESENTING 
A FATAL FLAW IN THE EVIDENCE, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1954, as amended) provides that the 
Appellate Court can grant relief if the person seeking review has been substantially 
prejudiced by agency action based upon a determination of fact that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. The 
meaning of the term that "the record was not supported by substantial evidence" has 
been explained and defined by this Cburt on a number of occasions. In Nelson v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated that 
"A party challenging the factual findings of the Board must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence." (quoting Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68) 801 P.2d 158 at 161. In Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989) this Court stated that. 
. . "a party" must marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous'" (citations 
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omitted). In West Valley Qty v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) the 
Court stated: 
. . . the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, ever scrap of confident evidence introduced 
at the trial which supports the very findings the appellate 
resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. 
818 P.2d 1311 at 1315. 
In the instant case, this was a particularly difficult standard to interpret and apply 
because the position of Petitioner is not so much that the evidence presented cannot be 
relied upon, rather, Petitioner's position is that the A U did not apply the proper 
standard of law on either the discrimination issue or the constructive discharge issue. 
Discrimination: Petitioner readily acknowledged in her Brief that, based on the 
evidence presented at the Hearing, Respondent had articulated seemingly legitimate 
reasons for the schedule given to Petitioner upon her return from maternity leave. The 
AU, however, failed to make any determination as to whether Petitioner had 
successfully rebutted those "legitimate reasons". As set forth in Petitioner's Brief, there 
was never any evidence presented to the ALJ to explain that despite those reasons and 
despite the written policy (which explained erratic shifts, short notice, baby-sitting 
problems and other difficulties with the job, and which Petitioner had signed), that no 
one in two years since the consolidation or subsequent to the consolidation had ever 
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been given a schedule as onerous as was Petitioner's. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact 
Statement No. 22) Also, during the approximate three weeks while Russell was training 
prior to Petitioner's return to work, no one was given the schedule which Petitioner was 
given upon her return, and following Petitioner's termination, for approximately one 
week Russell was still training and no one was given Petitioner's schedule. (See Brief, 
Fact Statement No. 22) 
Thus, the difficulty in "marshalling evidence" supporting the ALJ finding was that 
there was no finding and no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate a response to 
Petitioner's rebuttal of the "legitimate reasons". Rather, the ALJ decision simply stated 
that the Respondent had articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule. It was that 
finding with which Petitioner took issue and there was no evidence to marshall as to a 
response to Petitioner's rebuttal. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact Statement No. 22) 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to comply with the standards concerning the 
marshalling of evidence, Petitioner did in her Brief summarize, point by point, all of the 
evidence presented by Respondent at the Hearing which demonstrated a legitimate 
reason for the schedule. A comparison between Point II of Respondent's Brief and 
Point II of Petitioner's Brief will confirm that every piece of evidence supporting the 
"legitimate reasons" recited by Respondent were addressed by Petitioner's Brief, although 
in a summarized form. 
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Petitioner did meet her burden under the law. She did correlate the evidence 
with the challenged findings by acknowledging and summarizing the evidence presented 
by Respondent at the Hearing in regard to each of the challenged ALT findings; 
Petitioner then presented to this Court the evidence that demonstrates the pretext of 
those "articulated legitimate reasons". That is, Petitioner presented an uncontradicted 
rebuttal of all of the evidence concerning legitimate reasons for the action by 
Respondent.1 See West Valley City, supra at 1315. 
Petitioner has met her burden of showing the "fatal flaw" in the evidence 
presented by Respondent as to its "legitimate reasons". 
Constructive Discharge: Once again, it is really more a question of whether the 
judge correctly applied the law and of the total lack of evidence to support certain 
requirements under the law. Also, once again, Petitioner's Brief concerning constructive 
discharge specifically designates the findings of the ALJ of which she complains and 
Respondent did, in its Response Brief, for the very first time, raise an argument, 
although no evidence to support it, that the explanation as to why no one had ever been 
given such a schedule was that this was a unique situation that had never existed before 
or after. Respondent argues that the schedule had only been in existence for a few 
weeks and unique circumstances necessitated changes. Respondent gives no citation to 
any evidence which supports that this situation was unique any more than any situation, 
that is, every day was different, as acknowledged by Respondent and Petitioner, in that a 
schedule might have to be changed at any time due to absence, vacation, illness, etc. 
There was no evidence presented whatsoever at the Hearing to support that this situation 
was any more unique or difficult than many situations over the course of years. This is 
the first attempt to explain the disparate treatment and should not be considered by this 
Cburt at this late date. 
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Petitioner did acknowledge, in summary form, the evidence presented by Respondent 
concerning those findings. 
The standard for constructive discharge is whether or not a reasonable person 
would have found the situation intolerable. The employer has some obligation to give 
assurances that the situation would not continue and attempt to ameliorate the situation 
and the employee has some obligation to give the employer a reasonable opportunity to 
ameliorate or change the situation Garner, supra. 
In this case, as acknowledged by Petitioner's Brief, Respondent presented 
evidence on a number of the constructive discharge issues. Petitioner acknowledged all 
of the evidence, in summarized fashion, that is set forth in Respondent's Brief 
concerning constructive discharge. The critical point, the "fatal flaw", however, is that no 
evidence whatsoever was presented that would answer the question as to why no 
assurances were given to Petitioner and no attempt to ameliorate the situation was taken 
after Petitioner gave her notice on May 10th, Le^ after Respondent knew for a certainty 
that Petitioner found the schedule intolerable. There is no evidence to marshall as to 
any effort to give assurances or ameliorate after May 10th, despite the fact that 
Petitioner gave two weeks notice. (See Petitioner's Brief, Fact Statements Nos. 29, 34, 
53). Thus, once again, the AU and the Respondent fell short of meeting the entire legal 
standard concerning constructive discharge by failing to address the obligation to give 
assurances. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
Oral argument is requested in this case because Petitioner believes that the 
decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. The reason for this 
belief is that the primary issues in the case revolve around a complex, intricate and 
detailed scheduling process. The scheduling process was explained and discussed at great 
length at the Hearing which was approximately twelve hours in length. A brief 
explanation by counsel of the basic scheduling process and the pertinent factors involved 
would be helpful to the Court and save the Court considerable time in trying to 
understand the scheduling process and the documentation of a two year period of 
schedules. 
Petitioner does not believe a published opinion in this matter is necessary and 
does not request one. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner did address the issue of whether or not a prima facie case had been 
made. 
Petitioner did meet the burden of showing lack of substantial evidence. To 
marshall all of Respondent's evidence concerning "legitimate reasons" for the schedule 
and its failure to change or revise it after May 10th would not only be arduous but totally 
unnecessary. Petitioner acknowledged in her Brief that Respondent had put forth many 
seemingly legitimate explanations on its reasons for the schedule and its reasons for not 
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changing the schedule; however, both Respondent and the ALJ totally failed to address 
the critical issue under the law on discrimination and constructive discharge. Regarding 
discrimination, Respondent failed to present any evidence whatsoever as to why no one 
had ever been given such a pre-planned schedule. Regarding constructive discharge, 
Respondent failed to present any evidence as to why no one gave any assurances or 
made any attempts to ameliorate between May 10 (the date of Petitioner's resignation) 
and May 24 (Petitioner's last day at work). In other words, on the two "fatal flaws" there 
was no evidence to marshall. Nevertheless, Petitioner's Brief did, summarize the 
evidence of Respondent on every issue that is set forth in Respondent's Brief which 
Respondent claims support its case. 
Respondent requests that this Court sustain the Industrial Commission, on the 
grounds that Commissioner did not address the prima facie issue and did not correctly 
"marshall" the evidence favorable to Respondent; however, Respondent failed completely 
to address Point I of Petitioner's Brief, the ALJ's erroneous application of the law. The 
ALJ's erroneous application f the law was and still is a basis in and off itself for this 
Court to reverse the Commission, and this Court should do so. 
This Court should remand the matter to the Industrial Commission of Utah with 
directions to issue an Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Review, ordering 
Petitioner's reinstatement, to make findings and conclusions on the amount of money 
owed to her, that is determining the pay due her from the date of her constructive 
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discharge on May 24, 1990 plus interest at 10% per annum, and to obtain affidavits of 
costs and attorneys fees from Petitioner's counsel, calculate that amount into the total 
judgment in favor of Petitioner and enter judgment in favor of Petitioner against 
Respondent accordingly. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J0**1 day of June, 1995. 
Suzianne West 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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